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Abstract: Reliable continuing positioning is a critical requirement for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). An integrated 
positioning system is presented in this study, where the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) 
method was mainly used. When RTK is not available, positioning was maintained by a method using Doppler measurements or 
by using low-cost inertial measurement unit (IMU) coupled with car odometer measurements. A new integrity monitoring 
method is presented that addresses each positioning mode of the proposed integrated system. Models for the protection levels 
are presented to bound the position error along the direction of motion of the vehicle and for the cross-track direction. Both 
direction components are needed for ITS, for instance, for collision avoidance and for lane identification. The method was 
assessed through a kinematic test performed in a dense urban environment. Results showed that by integrating GNSS RTK, 
Doppler with IMU+odometer, positioning was available all the time. For RTK, positioning accuracy was less than a decimetre 
and the integrity monitoring availability met our target threshold of 99%, where the protection levels bounded the position 
errors and were less than an alert limit of 1 m. Positioning using Doppler and IMU+odometer measurements bridged RTK 
breaks but at the sub-meter level accuracy when used for short periods.  
 
1. Introduction 
Intelligent Transport systems (ITS) require continuous precise 
vehicle positioning in real time. They mainly relay on GNSS 
for positioning. However, buildings and other obstacles can 
obstruct signals, in particular in urban environment [1], thus 
GNSS needs to be integrated with other sensors such as 
inertial measurement units (IMUs) to bridge positioning 
during GNSS positioning breaks [2, 3]. In ITS, positioning is 
needed to the sub-metre accuracy level for in-lane 
positioning. Such accuracy can be achieved with methods 
such as Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) [4], Precise Point 
Positioning (PPP) [5, 6], and Satellite Based Augmentation 
Systems (SBAS). In this article we consider the use of GNSS 
integrated with low-cost IMU and measurements from vehicle 
odometer. RTK is currently under consideration by car 
manufacturers driven by the rapid decline of receiver cost and 
the development of economy single-frequency, and even 
dual-frequency, systems that can achieve a few cm to sub-m 
accuracy. However, the inexpensive Micro-electro-
mechanical systems (MEMS) IMUs that can be used in 
vehicle applications yield a heading bias that quickly grows 
with time. Such a bias can be adjusted by heading data 
computed from GNSS Doppler observations when they are 
available. These methods can only estimate position changes 
with time, and hence, their positioning errors accumulate with 
time. Thus, they can only be used for positioning of short 
outages of RTK positioning.  
 
For ITS safety-related applications, integrity monitoring (IM) 
is a key positioning performance parameter, where the system 
should be able to detect and exclude measurement faults, 
bound measurement errors, and trigger an alarm in the event 
that unreliable positioning performance is suspected. In 
addition, when no fault is detected, IM provides a protection 
level (PL) that should bound the true position error at a certain 
probability of risk [7]. Even though integrity requirements in 
vehicular transport have not been defined yet, the demand for 
higher levels of automation in an increasing number of 
applications is pushing the relevant authorities to urgently fill 
this gap.  
 
IM is currently being applied in aviation using Advanced 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) 
approach, which relies on the use of multi-frequency and 
multi-constellation phase-smoothed pseudorange 
observations [8-10]. However, limited research has been done 
for applications that utilise carrier-phase observations used in 
RTK, taken into consideration the carrier-phase ambiguity 
resolution. Some examples are given in [11, 12] for relative 
positioning, in [13] for PPP, and in [14] for RTK.  
 
So far, most IM proposed methods focused on applying 
ARAIM and only employing GNSS measurements. However, 
for ITS, GNSS cannot be used solely, and hence new IM 
methods are needed when integrating GNSS with other 
sensors [15]. In our earlier work [14], we discussed one 
method for positioning IM when RTK was integrated with 
low-cost IMU, vehicle odometer and Doppler observations 
for advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS). The PLs that 
bound the position error were presented for an overall 
horizontal vector and for the maximum-direction positioning 
component. In this contribution, a new model is presented for 
computation of the PLs, restricting our focus to horizontal 
positioning for the along-track and cross-track positioning 
components of the vehicles, which are of interest for forward 
collision warning, which is a major risk condition, and for in-
lane identification. The PL models are developed for 
continuous positioning for vehicular applications is proposed 
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by integrating RTK GNSS using code and phase observations 
supplemented by simple approaches using Doppler 
measurements, low-cost IMU, and vehicle odometer data.  
.  
The structure of the paper is organised as follows. The next 
section briefly overviews the positioning methods considered 
in this research. In Section 3, the proposed integrity 
monitoring method for the three positioning modes under 
consideration is presented. In section 4, the proposed method 
is evaluated using a kinematic test in a dense urban 
environment. Finally, the conclusion and future work are 
given.   
 
2. Positioning Modes 
The fault-free observation equation can be expressed as:  
y = G x +b+ (1) 
  
where y is the measurement vector, computed as the 
difference between the observations and their estimated 
values from the approximate position of the user. The null 
hypothesis is expressed as H0: E{y}= G x + b with D{y} = Qy, 
representing the covariance matrix of the observations, where 
E{} and D{} symbolize the expectation and dispersion 
operators. The unknown vector x is the difference between the 
final and approximate vehicle’s computed positions. b is the 
nominal biases (not considering outliers) and  is the 
observation noise [14].  
 
An RTK mode with a single reference station is considered in 
this study, where the vehicle receiver operates within a few 
kilometres from the reference receiver such that the broadcast 
orbital error and the atmospheric delays (ionosphere and 
troposphere) are cancelled by double-differencing the 
observations, leading to ±5 cm accuracy [16]. Similarly, a 
network RTK approach [17] can be applied. To achieve such 
accuracy, five or more satellites with a good geometry should 
be tracked when using one GNSS system and more than two 
satellites for each additional system to resolve the ambiguities 
on-the-fly. The G matrix is the geometry-design matrix, 
computed from the approximate position of the user and 
broadcast satellite positions.  
 
When the number of tracked satellites is reduced to our for a 
single GNSS system, for instance due to signal obstruction, 
and to bridge short RTK positioning gaps, the velocity 
computed from GNSS Doppler measurements can be time 
integrated to estimate changes in vehicle locations with time 
where the initial position can be determined from RTK. 
Consequently, the unknowns become the time change of E 
and N, denoted by E and N and the vehicle position at time 
t is then expressed as:  
Et=Et-1+Eand   Nt=Nt-1+N.    (2) 
 
where the G matrix reads: 
𝐺 =
1
∆𝑡
 ×  I    (3) 
I is the identity matrix. Positioning in this case is dependent 
on geometry of the tracked satellites and accuracy of the 
computed speed of the vehicle. This accuracy is a function of 
the vehicle speed itself.  When the vehicle is stationary, the 
observed Doppler measurements would represent noise. The 
second column in Table 1 summarises the empirical 
conditions, set based on our experimental testing, to avoid 
undesirable false jumps in the estimated velocity and to bound 
positioning errors to under 1 m for short breaks in RTK 
positioning. The shown VGNSS represents the speed estimated 
from GNSS Doppler observations. 
 
Table 1.  Empirical conditions for using different positioning modes 
RTK Using Doppler observations Doppler calibrating IMU+odometer 
 HDOP < 3 
 
 
 |VGNSS – VSS| < 0.5 m/s 
 (HDOP) < 1.5 
 
 The odometer speed > 0.5 m/s;   
 |VGNSS – VSS| < 1.5 m/s;  
 HDOP < 2.5 
 
If RTK or positioning using Doppler observations are 
unavailable, the positions can be estimated by integrating the 
speed estimated from the vehicle odometer (expressed as the 
scalar VSS) with the heading of the MEMS IMU, denoted as 𝜃. 
The Easting and Northing velocity components are computed 
as  𝑉𝐸 = sin(𝜃) ×  𝑉𝑠𝑠, and 𝑉𝑁 = cos(𝜃) ×  𝑉𝑠𝑠. These 
velocities are integrated in time to provide the position time 
changes in Easting and Northing directions, where the 
position is computed using (2). The observations are 
considered in this case as the mean values of the IMU heading 
() and the odometer speed, for instance between the epochs 
t-1 and t. Thus, the G matrix is expressed as: 
𝐺𝑡 = [
𝜕 𝜃
𝜕Δ𝐸
𝜕 𝜃
𝜕Δ𝑁
𝜕 𝑣
𝜕Δ𝐸
𝜕 𝑣
𝜕Δ𝑁
]
𝑡
=  [
Δ𝑁
Δ𝐸2+Δ𝑁2
− Δ𝐸
Δ𝐸2+Δ𝑁2
Δ𝐸
Δt×√Δ𝐸2+Δ𝑁2
Δ𝑁
Δt×√Δ𝐸2+Δ𝑁2
]
𝑡
     (4) 
As mentioned earlier, the IMU heading bias is cumulative; 
accordingly, it should be frequently calibrated. When Doppler 
velocities are available, they can be used to compute the initial 
values of IMU heading and for calibration of the IMU 
heading, that can applied at short intervals to control the 
growth of this bias [18-20]. The computed heading from 
Doppler measurements at time t (denoted as 𝜃𝑡) is calculated 
from 𝜃𝑡 =  𝑡𝑎𝑛
−1 (
𝑉𝐸𝑡
𝑉𝑁𝑡
), where 𝑉𝐸𝑡  and 𝑉𝑁𝑡  denote the 
velocity components in the local-level frame. The operational 
empirical conditions for this case to keep the heading error to 
below 2 degrees are listed in the third column in Table 1. If 
these conditions are not met, or when Doppler measurements 
are not available, the IMU is calibrated when the vehicle is 
stationary by applying a Zero-velocity update (ZUPT).  
Figure 1 shows a flowchart of the positioning approach 
proposed in this simple system [14], where it is applied in the 
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following order depending on fulfilment of the set empirical 
conditions given in Table 1: RTK; henceforth using Doppler 
measurements; and last using MEMS IMU coupled with 
odometer data. The latter two methods have positioning error 
that increases with time; thus, they should only be restricted 
to bridging short breaks in RTK.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Flowchart of positioning using the integrated RTK GNSS/IMU/odometer system [14] 
 
3. Integrity Monitoring 
In IM, the system is monitored to detect and exclude faults in 
the observations. Next, the protection levels (PLs) that bound 
the true position errors with a probability that does not exceed 
the allowable integrity risk are computed. When each PL does 
not exceed a threshold (alert limit), IM is considered 
available. In this section, a summary of the integrity 
monitoring for the presented system is given.  
  
3.1. Detection and exclusion of faulty observations 
In the presence of suspected faults, or large errors, denoted 
here as 𝛻, the observation model can be expressed as: 
 
𝑦 = 𝐺 𝑥 +  𝐶 𝛻 + 𝑏 +  𝜀 (5) 
 
which gives the alternative hypothesis Ha: E{y}= 𝐺 𝑥 +
 𝐶 𝛻 + 𝑏. In principle, detection of these faults can be 
performed by applying a consistency check among all 
possible sets of observations. Hence, we can only detect faults 
when positioning can be available from at least one set of 
error-free observations. Accordingly, we can detect up to q 
number of faults when 1≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑑𝑓, where df is the degrees of 
freedom. In (5), C is a matrix that describes which 
observations are suspected to be faulty. For m observations, C 
will have m×q dimension, where each of its columns has a one 
corresponding to the observation assumed to be affected by a 
fault and zeros elsewhere. The matrix should be set to test all 
possibilities of the presence of errors in the observations. In 
RTK, due to the correlation between phase and code errors, 
cycle slips of phase observations are first detected and 
repaired and next code outliers are excluded [23]. Several 
methods are presented for cycle slip detection, for instance by 
using the time difference of the between phase observations 
from two frequencies or by monitoring the rate of change of 
the ionosphere delay [21, 22]. 
 
Utilizing the observation residuals, the best estimator of the 
error vector (?̂?) can be determined from [24]: 
?̂? = (𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑦
−1𝑄?̂?𝑄𝑦
−1𝐶)−1𝐶𝑇𝑄𝑦
−1?̂? (6) 
 
with its covariance matrix expressed as: 
𝑄?̂? = (𝐶
𝑇𝑄𝑦
−1𝑄?̂?𝑄𝑦
−1𝐶)−1 (7) 
 
where ?̂? and 𝑄?̂?  are the computed observation residuals and 
their covariance matrix is computed as: 
  𝑄?̂? = 𝑄y − [𝐺(𝐺
𝑇𝑄y
−1𝐺)−1𝐺𝑇]. 
 
The uniformly most powerful invariant (UMPI) test is applied 
for a quick detection of faults. Under the assumption that the 
observation errors (but not the outliers) are zero-mean 
Gaussian; the statistic (?̂?𝑇𝑄?̂?
−1 ?̂?) in the fault-free mode will 
have a Chi-square distribution. Accordingly, observation 
Stream 1 Stream 2 Stream 3 
Computes heading 
from GNSS Doppler 
Meets GNSS 
heading 
Conditions 
Yes 
Update heading of the 
IMU (GNSS & ZUPT) 
Computes positions 
from Speed of Speed 
sensor and IMU 
heading 
No 
Doppler 
available 
Yes 
RTK 
available 
No 
Yes 
Computes 
positions using 
RTK 
Yes 
Compute velocity 
from GNSS Doppler 
Compute positions 
from GNSS velocity  
Meets GNSS 
Velocity 
Conditions 
No 
Output position  
No 
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errors are suspected when they exceed a certain threshold, i.e. 
when [24]: 
?̂?𝑇𝑄?̂?
−1 ?̂?  ≥ χα1
2 (𝑑𝑓, 0) (8) 
 
where χα1
2 (𝑑𝑓, 0) is the Chi-square threshold computed at a 
given significance level – or a false alarm - (𝛼1) and 𝑑𝑓. If 
the test fails, one needs to identify and exclude the suspected 
observations corresponding to the suspected faults.  
Using least squares for fault detection, the solution of the 
unknown position expressed in the Easting-Northing-Up (E-
N-U) frame reads: 
 
?̂? = 𝑅 (𝐺𝑇  𝑄𝑦
−1 𝐺)−1 𝐺𝑇  𝑄𝑦
−1 𝑦 = 𝑆  𝑦  (9) 
 
where 𝑆 = 𝑅 (𝐺𝑇  𝑄𝑦
−1 𝐺)−1 𝐺𝑇 𝑄𝑦
−1 is the pseudo inverse, 
which maps the observations onto the unknowns. In RTK, R 
is the rotation matrix from the Cartesian frame, in which the 
GNSS satellite positions are expressed, to the E-N-U frame. 
In the other two positioning scenarios, using Doppler 
observations and IMU + odometer measurements, R is the 
identity matrix. To identify which observations are faulty, the 
solution separation method can be applied [8]. For each 
potential fault mode i, which may include one or more 
observations. An analogous 𝑆𝑖 matrix is computed by 
excluding the suspected observations as follows:  
 
 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑅( 𝐺
𝑇  (𝐴𝑖  𝑄𝑦
−1) 𝐺 )−1 𝐺𝑇  (𝐴𝑖𝑄𝑦
−1)                     (10) 
 
where 𝐴𝑖  is an identity matrix reformed such that the diagonal 
elements corresponding to the suspected faulty measurements 
in mode i are replaced by zero. The residual positional vector 
|?̂? − ?̂?𝑖 | is then determined from (9) and: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖  𝑦                                                            (11) 
 
The standard deviations of the difference between the two 
solutions ?̂? and ?̂?𝑖 (denoted here as 𝜎𝑑𝐸𝑖 , 𝜎𝑑𝑁𝑖 , 𝜎𝑑𝑈𝑖) are next 
computed as: 
 
𝜎𝑞 =  √𝑎𝑘
𝑇  ( 𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆) 𝑄𝑦( 𝑆𝑖 − 𝑆)𝑇 𝑎𝑘   
(12) 
 
 
where k=1, 2, 3 corresponding to 𝑑𝐸𝑖 ,  𝑑𝑁𝑖 , 𝑑𝑈𝑖  such that   
𝑎1
𝑇 = [1, 0, 0],  𝑎2
𝑇 = [0, 1, 0], and 𝑎3
𝑇 = [0, 0, 1]. The null 
hypothesis of the test is Ho: 
|𝑥− 𝑥𝑖|𝑞
𝜎𝑞,𝑖
~ 𝑁(0,1), and one can 
reject Ho in favour of the alternative hypnosis, and assume 
confirmation of a faulty observation(s) in mode i, if for any k:  
where 𝑁𝛼2
2
(0,1) is the test threshold computed as the inverse 
of the complement of the one-sided standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. Assuming the same total 
probability of false alarm (α1), and assuming that it is equally 
distributed for the Easting and Northing components; this 
gives    𝛼2 =  
α1
2 × number of fault modes 
.  
 
Typically, in RTK, code outliers are uncorrelated [25]; thus, 
if cycle slips are successfully detected and repaired the 
likelihood of a faulty measurement to mask another faulty 
measurement would be low. To confirm the exclusion of 
faulty measurements, we reapply the UMPI test and next a 
confirmation test is performed using the w test employing he 
normalised residuals, where for observation j we have [26]:  
  
𝑤𝑗 =  
?̂?𝑗
𝜎?̂?𝑗
                                                              (14) 
 
𝜎?̂?𝑗   is the standard deviation of ?̂?𝑗 computed from the 
covariance matrix 𝑄?̂?. Assuming that the fault-free 
observations are Gaussian with zero-mean; the normalised 
residuals would consequently follow a standard normal 
distribution. Therefore, we confirm the exclusion of faulty 
observation j in mode i when:  
 
|𝑤𝑗| ≥ 𝑁𝛼3
2
(0,1)       |wj| ≥ |wl|        for l= 1 to m            (15) 
 
where 𝑁𝛼3
2
(0,1) is the inverse of the complement of standard 
normal distribution for 
𝛼3
2
. 𝛼3 is computed from the total 
significance level (𝛼), which is assumed equally distributed 
among the observations; hence, 𝛼3 =  𝛼/number of 
observations. 𝛼 is computed using Baarda’s B method [26], 
which assumes same probability for a type II error (failure to 
reject a false null hypothesis) in both the detection and 
identification tests. 
 
The fault detection and exclusion (FDE) process described 
above is applied for the RTK mode. The measurements 
passing FDE next proceed to computation of the PLs. For 
detection of errors in the vehicle speed determined when using 
Doppler observations, the test using speed dilution of 
precession (SDOP) presented in [27] can be performed.  For 
the case of positioning by using MEMS IMU heading + 
odometer speed that was presented earlier, there are no 
degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the FDE approach would 
not be possible and hence, the PL should be monitored. They 
should not exceed the alert limit. Computations of these PLs 
is subsequently discussed in the next section. 
 
|?̂? − ?̂?𝑖|𝑘
𝜎𝑞,𝑖
≥  𝑁𝛼2
2
(0,1) 
 
(13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Computation of the protection level 
 
For a moving vehicle one may consider its position along its 
direction of motion, and present this position in a vehicle-
track specific reference frame. This 3D frame can be 
expressed by the along-track and cross-track horizontal 
position components and the vertical position [28, 29]. The 
position vector and its covariance matrix in the along-tack, 
cross-track and Up (AT-CT-U) frame, define as 𝑣𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇−𝑈 and 
𝑄𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇−𝑈 respectively, are computed from the position vector 
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and covariance matrix in the (E, N and U) frame (𝑣𝐸−𝑁−𝑈 and 
𝑄𝐸−𝑁−𝑈) by means of a clockwise rotation matrix 𝑅𝜃, defined  
by the azimuthal direction of motion of the vehicle (, angle 
measured clockwise from North), where: 
 
 𝑣𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇−𝑈 =  𝑅𝜃 𝑣𝐸−𝑁−𝑈    
𝑄𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇−𝑈 =  𝑅𝜃
𝑇 𝑄𝐸−𝑁−𝑈 𝑅𝜃       
with   𝑅𝜃 =  [
sin 𝜃 cos 𝜃 0
cos 𝜃 −𝑠𝑖𝑛 𝜃 0
0 0 1
]                             (16) 
 
The positioning errors, estimated as the difference between 
the true position and the estimated position, are typically 
unknown since the former is usually unspecified. Thus, the 
error should be bounded by the PL. We are generally not 
interested in the vertical component of the position in ITS 
applications; therefore, we restrict our focus only to the 
Horizontal PLs. for the AT-CT-U frame, the along-track PL 
(denoted as PLAT) and cross-track PL (PLCT) are considered. 
In practice, the PLAT is of interest in applications such as 
forward-collision warning, which is a major collision risk, 
whereas PLCT is of interest in carriage way departure alert and 
for lane identification of the vehicle, which is a key 
information parameter in ITS.  
 
For the AT and CT positioning errors (denoted as 𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑇  and 
𝑑𝑥𝐶𝑇), respectively, the protection levels (PLAT and  PLCT) 
should ensure that P(|𝑑𝑥𝐴𝑇 | ≥ PLAT) ≤ PAT and  P(|𝑑𝑥𝐶𝑇| ≥ 
PLCT) ≤ PCT, where P(I)AT and P(I)CT are the the maximum 
allowable probability of risk (integrity risk) for AT and CT 
position components, which are set based on the application 
considered. In this contribution, we assume the same PI for 
AT and CT, such that PAT =PCT = 
1
2
𝑃(𝐼)𝐻 where 𝑃(𝐼)𝐻 is 
the horizontal integrity risk. 
 
 𝑃(𝐼)𝐻  is defined in terms of the conditioned probabilities and 
the probability of miss-detection as discussed in [14]. In RTK, 
ambiguity fixing has to be taken into consideration. Two 
events can take place, correct fixing (CF) and incorrect fixing 
(IF), with their probabilities expressed as PCF and PIF. The 
events are mutually exclusive and exhausting such that PIF = 
1 - PCF [12]. Consequently, we consider integrity risk of 
combined probability of three cases. The first case accounts 
for miss-detection at an event where the ambiguities are 
correctly fixed and no errors are detected but the overall 
position error is larger than the PL resulting in flagging 
system integrity. The second case accounts for miss-detection 
when the carrier-phase ambiguities are wrongly resolved and 
the position error is larger than the PL when all satellites are 
used, and similarly for the third case but with removing 
satellite observation(s) in fault mode i. In our system, the 
above probabilities are evaluated using the method described 
in [11]. For the other two positioning systems, i.e. when using 
Doppler measurements and when using IMU-odometer 
measurements, we assume the same 𝑃(𝐼)𝐻  to ensure the 
consistency of the system performance.  
 
The PLs are modelled on the basis of the multi-hypothesis 
solution-separation method [8]. In RTK, with df > 0, a 
position error bound is computed for each possible fault mode 
(i) that might be miss-detected. This is performed by 
computing a position solution unaffected by the fault, by 
excluding the suspected observations and computing an error 
bound around this solution; and accounting for the difference 
between the position solution from all observations and the 
fault tolerant position [7, 14]. The PLAT and PLCT for fault 
mode i can be expressed as: 
  
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇,𝑖
=  𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑖   𝜎𝛿𝐴𝑇,𝑖 + 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖   𝜎𝐴𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(sin 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇  𝑆𝑖 ×  𝑏𝑜)2 +  (cos 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆𝑖 × 𝑏𝑜)2   
 
 
𝑃𝐿𝐶𝑇,𝑖
=  𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑖   𝜎𝛿𝐶𝑇,𝑖 + 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖   𝜎𝐶𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(cos 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇  𝑆𝑖 ×  𝑏𝑜)2 +   (sin 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆𝑖 × 𝑏𝑜)2   
(17) 
  
where 𝜎𝐴𝑇  and 𝜎𝐶𝑇  are the standard deviations for the AT and 
CT position components computed from 𝑄𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇−𝑈. 𝜎𝛿𝐴𝑇,𝑖  and 
𝜎𝛿𝐶𝑇,𝑖 are estimated from 𝜎𝑑𝐸𝑖 , 𝜎𝑑𝑁𝑖  given in (10) of the sub-
covariance matrix of (E and N) calculated from (𝑆 − 𝑆𝑖) and 
using the covariance propagation law as shown in (16). 𝑏𝑜 is 
a nominal GNSS observation bias, which is different for code 
and phase observations, and between systems (GPS, BeiDou, 
etc.). The biases can be attributed to antenna phase centre 
offset at the reference station, residual relative orbital and 
atmospheric errors, and hardware biases [30]. The absolute 
value of the bias is added to bound the worst case scenario and 
to ensure that the continuity requirement is met [16]. The case 
of a fault-free full set of observations is also considered by 
setting the fault mode i to zero. The final protection levels 
PLAT and PLCT are considered as the max{PLAT,i} and 
max{PLCT,i} respectively.  
 
In this paper, integrity monitoring for RTK is computed using 
an epoch-by-epoch least-squares method after validation of 
the ambiguities. Accordingly, no dynamic model was used. 
Hence, the possibility of experiencing ramping errors due to 
the dynamic model errors from previous epochs affecting the 
current epoch were not taken into consideration. The use of 
Kalman filtering that takes this effect into consideration will 
be addressed in a future study. 
 
The 𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑖 and 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖 are scaling coefficients. Assuming that 
GNSS measurement noise is Gaussian with zero mean, the 2D 
position error after resolving the integer carrier-phase 
ambiguities can be considered as a random variable with a 
zero-mean Gaussian distribution.  Hence, 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖  is the inverse 
of the complement of the one-sided standard normal 
cumulative distribution function (i.e. 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖  =  − Q
−1(𝛽)) to 
satisfy the miss-detection probability , which can either be 
pre-set as explained in [14], and  𝐾𝑓𝑎,𝑖 =  − Q
−1 (
𝛼
2𝑚
) where 
we assume  in this research.   
 
When positioning using GNSS Doppler-measurements, 
where df = 0, the PLs are expressed as: 
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𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇,𝑖
= 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖   𝜎𝐴𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(sin 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝑣𝐸
𝑏𝑣𝑁
])2 +   (cos 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝑣𝐸
𝑏𝑣𝑁
])2   
 
  
𝑃𝐿𝐶𝑇,𝑖
= 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖   𝜎𝐶𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(cos 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝑣𝐸
𝑏𝑣𝑁
])2 +  (sin 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝑣𝐸
𝑏𝑣𝑁
])2   
(18) 
  
where 𝑏𝑣𝐸 and 𝑏𝑣𝑁 are assumed values for the nominal 
velocity biases in the Easting and Northing directions 
determined from Doppler measurements.  
For the case of integrating the heading from MEMS IMU and 
speed of the odometer, where df = 0, the IMU heading bias 
should be frequently adjusted by other methods, such as 
GNSS-Doppler-based heading and ZUPT. The PLs are 
expressed as: 
𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇,𝑖
= 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖  𝜎𝐴𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(sin 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇 𝑆 [
𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈
𝑏𝑣
])2 +   (cos 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈
𝑏𝑣
])2   
 
  
𝑃𝐿𝐶𝑇,𝑖
= 𝐾𝑚𝑑,𝑖  𝜎𝐶𝑇,𝑖  
+ √(cos 𝜃 𝑎1
𝑇 𝑆 [
𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈
𝑏𝑣
])2 +  (sin 𝜃 𝑎2
𝑇  𝑆 [
𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈
𝑏𝑣
])2   
(19
) 
 
𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈 is a scalar representing possible unaccounted for IMU 
heading bias, whereby, the impact of this bias on positioning 
before IMU calibration, and its growth with time has to be 
considered. It is assumed here that this bias increases linearly 
with time, and hence,  𝑏𝜃𝐼𝑀𝑈 =  𝑏𝜃𝑜 +  Δ𝑏 × ∆𝑡, where 𝑏𝜃𝑜  is 
the initial bias, Δ𝑏 is the bias time-derivative, and ∆𝑡 is the 
time difference between current epoch and the epoch at which 
the IMU was last calibrate. 𝑏𝑣  is the bias attributed to velocity 
measured by the odometer. 
 
As mentioned earlier, when positioning using Doppler 
measurements or when using IMU+odometer measurements, 
only time-changes of positions are measured. Consequently, 
the integrity risk has to take into account the accumulation of 
errors with time in addition to the possibility of experiencing 
instantaneous faults. The parametric equation for these cases 
can be presented as:  
[
𝐸𝑡
𝑁𝑡
] =
∆𝑡
2
 [
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
] [
𝑣𝐸𝑡−1
𝑣𝑁𝑡−1
𝑣𝐸𝑡
𝑣𝑁𝑡
] +  [
𝐸𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
]                  (20) 
where t is the time difference between t and t-1. The 
covariance matrix of the unknown coordinates ( 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡) is then 
given as: 
 
𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡 = 𝐴  𝑄𝑜𝑏𝑠  𝐴
𝑇 + 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡−1   (21) 
 
where 𝐴 =
∆𝑡
2
 [
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
] and the initial covariance 
matrix is taken from the covariance matrix of the initial 
position, determined from RTK. To limit the development of 
the accumulated error, this positioning approach needs to be 
reinitialized at short time intervals, for instance using RTK. 
The 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑘 is re-set with this re-initialization. Such approach 
will result in a sawtooth-like pattern for the PL to adapt to the 
growth-reset error behaviour, as will be shown in the next 
sections. The 𝑄(𝐴𝑡−𝐶𝑇)𝑡  is computed from 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝑡 by applying 
the covariance propagation law using the 2D rotation matrix 
𝑅𝜃 =  [
sin 𝜃 cos 𝜃
cos 𝜃 −sin 𝜃
]. 
For the three positioning methods discussed so far, the 
accuracy requirement is selected at 95% confidence level and 
is evaluated by: 
AccuracyAT (95%) =   𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐   𝜎AT   <  Tacc-AT  
AccuracyCT (95%) =   𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐   𝜎CT  < Tacc-CT,    
taking 𝐾𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 1.96.   (22) 
 
where Tacc-AT and Tacc-CT are the accuracy threshold for the AT 
and CT position components, to be set according to the 
application considered. RTK typically provides accuracy < 5 
cm, whereas the Doppler-based and IMU+odometer 
positioning can only provide sub-m accuracy for short periods 
of operation, which may grow to several metres for longer 
operational periods when left without calibration.  
 
4. Testing 
A kinematic test was conducted to evaluate the proposed 
method where a small vehicle was used fitted with RTK 
system, and a Bosch-consumer grade MEMS IMU. The test 
is performed in a dense urban environment in Tokyo, Japan 
that includes several multi-story buildings. The test trajectory 
is shown in Figure 2. The RTK system used GPS, GLONASS 
and BeiDou dual-frequency observations of 10 Hz sampling 
interval. The heading error of the used MEMS IMU ranged 
from -2o to 5o, which can accumulate to 10o after 30 min 
without calibration [14]. Our previous examination of this 
IMU system has shown that it has a zero bias in the static 
mode, but in the kinematic mode, the bias can reach 
approximately 0.004o/s. For the odometer, the standard 
deviation of the computed speed is estimated as 5 cm/s, and 
for the speed determined from GNSS-Doppler measurements 
it is 10 cm/s.  
The positioning error (PE) in the RTK mode was estimated as 
the difference between RTK positions with those determined 
from post-mission kinematic processing (PPK) of the same 
data using independent software (Trimble Business Centre). 
A comparison between the two approaches in a pre-rest static 
mode showed that no software-bias was present. The 
positioning errors for the two other cases, firstly when using 
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Doppler measurements and secondly when using 
IMU+odometer were computed by differencing their 
positions with the output  from a POS/LV system (developed 
by Applanix Inc.), which was mounted on the vehicle and has 
a nominal positioning accuracy equals 20 cm. 
  
Possible values for horizontal alert limit (HAL) and integrity 
risk () for ITS, which are expected to be application 
dependent, are currently under investigation by various 
research groups and transport authorities. Since no standards 
are available yet, the PLs in our tests were computed using a 
range of values of  ranging between 1×10-3 and 1×10-6 in 
order to experimentally show the effect of setting a certain 
value of on integrity monitoring results. An 99% integrity 
availability is aimed for RTK using () of 0.01.  
 
   
Fig. 2. Test trajectory in Tokyo 
 
5. Results 
Positioning using a system of combined RTK, Doppler and 
IMU+odometer is carried out following the work-order 
described in Figure 1, and provided that the set conditions 
specified in Table 1 are satisfied. Results show that 
positioning was available during the entire test period. RTK 
was available for 72.2% of the test trajectory with outages 
ranging from 1s to 49.2s, where positioning is bridged by 
Doppler-based positioning for 25.8% of the test period. The 
IMU+odometer method was required for for short periods 
ranging between 0.5s and 4s, totalling 2% of the full period.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the time series of PL during the whole 
test period for the along-track and cross-track directions 
(shown as PL_AT and PL_CT) and the absolute values of the 
positioning errors along these directions, denoted as err_AT 
and err_CT, and using an integrity risk of 1×10-4 and 1×10-6 
as examples. The PE and PL for different systems are shown, 
such that the results of the combined systems are given first 
in the top panel of the figures, next RTK results are illustrated 
in the 2nd panel. In the 3rd panel, Doppler results are depicted, 
and lastly the IMU+odometer positioning results are shown at 
the bottom panel of the figures. For a better demonstration of 
the RTK results, the error scale is set smaller (0.5m) in the 
relevant figures than the rest of the sub-figures.   
 
The obtained positioning accuracy using different methods is 
expressed in terms of the position errors computed by 
referencing each of them to a more precise method as 
explained above. Table 2 shows the median of the absolute 
positioning errors and the RMSE for each mode. The table 
and the Figures 3 and 4 show that the RTK with correct 
ambiguity resolution provided positioning errors of a few cm. 
Positioning using Doppler measurements and IMU+odometer 
provided sub-m level accuracy when they were employed for 
short periods, which was less than 50s for Doppler and less 
than 5s for IMU+odometer. For longer periods the error may 
reach several meters. Consequently, positioning using 
Doppler measurements was reinitialized every one minute. 
For the corresponding PLs, the sawtooth pattern, discussed 
earlier, resulting from the accumulation of errors until the 
system is reinitialized is shown in the figures. Similarly, the 
ramping accumulated heading biases between IMU 
calibrations dominated the behaviour of this positioning mode 
as depicted in the Figures 3 and 4. In general, positioning by 
a low-cost MEMS IMU gave the worst accuracy compared to 
the two other positioning approaches, where the error reached 
0.53m after 4s, which can grow to more than 2 m in less than 
20s if left without calibration. Hence, this method should be 
restricted to bridging positioning by RTK only for very short 
periods. The other option is to use an IMU of a better grade. 
Note here that the results of Table 2 refer to the use of Doppler 
measurements for up to 49 sec, whereas the results of 
IMU+odometer were limited to its use for up to 4 sec, which 
explains why results from the former appear to be worse than 
the latter. For a similar period of operation, the MEMS IMU 
will accumulate more errors.  
 
Fifteen faulty code measurements have been detected and 
isolated, which may be caused by high multipath in this high-
density urban environment. In addition, the figures show that 
there were a few cases where the ambiguity resolution appears 
to be incorrectly fixed by a few cycles. However, the 
computed PLs sensed this behaviour through the escalation in 
standard deviations and consequently were increased to 
bound this error. In general, RTK with correct ambiguity 
resolution generally yield positioning of a few cm errors. Such 
errors will be bounded by tight protection levels and 
inspection of the Figures shows that an Alert Limit (AL) can 
be safely chosen as 1m. 
 
Recall that in integrity monitoring we check that the position 
error (PE) is bounded by PL and PL should be lower than AL. 
Analysis of the results demonstrated that the positioning 
errors were always bounded by the protection levels during 
the test period (i.e. PE<PL<AL) for the full period of RTK 
positioning and when positioning using Doppler 
measurements, as well as during the majority of 
IMU+odometer positioning, which gave a total availability of 
integrity monitoring > 99%. These results verify the initial 
validation of the proposed method.    
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Fig. 3.  PL_AT, PL_CT and positioning errors for the AT (left) and CT (right) for the combined systems (top panel), RTK (2nd 
panel), Doppler Positioning (3rd panel), and IMU+odometer positioning (bottom panel), integrity risk= 1×10-4.  
 
Table 2. Median positioning error and RMSE for AT and CT directions (m) 
Positioning mode Median Error RMSE 
(AT) (CT) (AT) (CT) 
RTK 0.058 0.054 0.077 0.105 
Doppler 0.163 0.172 0.332 0.442 
IMU+odometer 0.150 0.321 0.249 0.206 
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Fig. 4.  PL_AT, PL_CT and positioning errors for the AT (left) and CT (right) for the combined systems (top panel), RTK (2nd 
panel), Doppler Positioning (3rd panel), and IMU+odometer positioning (bottom panel), integrity risk= 1×10-6.  
 
 
The median of the PL for the AT and CT directions using 
different approaches are given in the Tables 4 and 5. The 
median is used in place of the mean value as the former is less 
affected by outliers and skewed values of PLs as discussed in 
[14]. The Tables show that PLs increase with the reduction of 
the allowed integrity risk. This can also be seen by comparing 
the Figures 3 and 4. This increase in PLs is attributed to the 
fact that the decrease of the integrity risks (probability) 
amplifies the scaling factor used in the PL models. When the 
PL exceeds the AL (which should be selected according to the 
application at hand) integrity monitoring is affirmed as 
unavailable. Thereby, the increase of the integrity risks can 
lead to significant unavailability of IM, and hence, this value 
should be carefully selected. 
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Table 4. Median PL_AT using different positioning modes and different values of integrity risk (m) 
Integrity risk 1×10-3 1×10-4 1×10-5 1×10-6 
RTK 0.176 0.197 0.215 0.232 
Doppler 1.355 1.621 1.851 2.057 
IMU+odometer 1.208 1.368 1.506 1.601 
 
Table 5. Median PL_CT using different positioning modes and different values of integrity risk (m) 
Integrity risk 1×10-3 1×10-4 1×10-5 1×10-6 
RTK 0.148 0.164 0.177 0.188 
Doppler 1.802 2.159 2.468 2.623 
IMU+odometer 0.884 1.101 1.150 1.191 
 
6. Conclusion 
A new integrity monitoring (IM) methodology is presented 
for a proposed system that can be used for intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS). The system includes GNSS 
RTK integrated with low-cost MEMS IMU and automotive 
odometer. A new approach for computation of the protection 
levels is discussed for each of the three positioning modes. 
These protection levels bound the positioning errors for the 
direction of movement of the vehicle (along-track), which is 
of interest for collision avoidance, and for the cross-track 
direction, needed for lane identification.  
 
Pilot testing of the proposed system was carried out in a dense 
urban area, which is a challenging environment for ITS 
applications. Results proved initial validity of the proposed 
integrity monitoring method. For RTK with correct ambiguity 
resolution, tight PLs were created and an alert limit of 1 m can 
be safely used with IM availability larger than 99%. This can 
support several ITS applications. Positioning using Doppler 
measurements or using IMU+vehicle odomter can bridge 
short breaks of RTK. However, as these methods compute the 
time-change in positioning and their errors and biases 
accumulate with time, they need frequent calibration. Their 
bridging of positioning is thus recommended only for a few 
seconds, where sub-meter accuracy can be obtained. Since 
standards for selection of integrity risk in ITS are not yet 
defined, which could be application dependent, testing of the 
proposed system and IM methodology was performed using 
several values, ranging from 1×10-3 to 1×10-6. This is to 
experimentally show the effect of selecting the integrity risk 
on the outcomes. Results showed that the protection levels 
increased with the decrease of the allowable integrity risk, 
which can lead to significant unavailability of IM. Thus, 
careful selection of this value is needed while satisfying the 
application positioning continuity requirements. Our future 
work includes investigating the use of a higher-grade IMU 
that can be afforded by the automotive industry and 
implementation of the algorithms in a Kalman filtering data 
processing scheme. 
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